Only a few European integration experts know that Jean Monnet, one of the masterminds of the European Coal and Steel Community, strongly preferred the European Atomic Energy Communitl to the European Economic Community in the 1950s and 1960s. From his point of view, sectoral and technical cooperation in the field of nuclear energy seemed to be much more promising in order to foster European integration than cross-sectoral economic integration. Monnet and others believed that nuclear energy could, inter alia, solve all energy supply problems, would revolutionize research and technical development, ·The author is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Konstanz (Konstanz, Germany) and the Liechtensteinlnstltut (Bendern, LieChtenstein), and lecturer at the University of Liechtenstein (Vaduz, Liechtenstein). Email: sebastlan.wolf@uni-konstanz.de.
of Europe: While a slight majority of European citizens oppose nuclear energy, attitudes considerably vary from country to country.
13
In the last decades, there have not been many cases in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the General Court (i.e. the former Court of First Instance) had to. deal with substantial Euratom law.
14 Most of these cases are similar and rather unspectacular actions initiated by the European Commission for declaration of a failure of a member state to fulfill its obligations under certain Euratom directives. The Temelfn judgment/ 5 however, is a "milestone decision" 16 with significant political implications. lt is about the important question of who ultimately decides the level of nuclear radiation protection in the EU multi-level system. This article, at the intersection of political science and law, takes the Temelfn case as a starting point to analyze different modes of governance that represent diverging approaches to deal with such a transnational issue of high political salience. If the EU takes into account the perceptions and demands of the people, it will probably gain acceptance and legitimacy. However, the EU institutions will not contribute to sustainable European integration in this policy field if they ignore the citizens' attitudes regarding nuclear safety.
17
This paper first summarizes the Temelfn case, which is barely known even by many European integration experts (Part B.). The following section contains a short critique of the judgment (Part C.). The rest of the article will focus on the decisive political question (Part D.) underlying the Temelfn case. Drawing on the arguments of the actors involved in the Temelfn case, four competing modes of governance can be distinguished (Part E.): unilateralism (Part E.l.), hierarchical supranationalism (Part E.II.L deliberative nationalism (Part E.lll.) and deliberative supranationalism (Part E.IV.). The concluding section tries to outline a framework that could bring political actors to behave in a deliberative way in conflicts such as the Temelfn dispute (Part F.). Due to the recent serious accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, an epilog discusses the governance of nuclear emergencies in the context of Euratom (Part G.).
13 EUROBAROMETER, supra note 5, at 4D-73. See also infra Part B.
14 The author has detected only 27 cases involving substantial Euratom law since 1990. The dispute about the safety of the Temelfn nuclear power plant involves several actors in Austria (specifically the federal government, the Land Oberosterreich and private parties) and the Czech Republic (specifically the central government and CEZ, the company operating the power station). Before presenting the facts of the case (Part B.l.) and the ECJ's judgment (Part B.ll.), it seems useful to have a look at the different perceptions of the people in Austria and the Czech Republic regarding nuclear energy. The disposal of radioactive waste can be done in a safe manner Totally agree/tend to agree 26% Tend to disagree/totally disagree 69% Nuclear power plants are sufficiently secured against terrorist attacks Totally agree/tend to agree 24% Tend to disagree/totally disagree 69% Nuclear materials are sufficiently protected against malevolent use Totally agree/tend to agree 27% Tend to disagree/totally disagree 67% Personally, taking into account all that you know about this topic, thinking about you and your family, do you see nuclear energy more as a benefit or more as a risk?
More as a risk 75% More as a benefit 13%
I. The Context of the Dispute
In the words of the ECJ, the facts of the Temelfn case can be summarized as follows:
20
The Land Oberosterreich is the owner of land used for agriculture and agricultural trials, on which there is an agricultural college. The land is situated about 60 km from the Temelfn nuclear power plant, which itself is situated in the Czech Republic, 50 km from the Austrian radioactive waste in whatever form ... , both in normal operation and in the event of an accident ... , is not liable to result in radioactive contamination, significant from the point of view of health, of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State'. On 3 November 2006, the two reactors of the Temelfn power plant were inspected and found to be compliant with the prevailing legislation; a definitive declaration was issued to that effect. 
The ECJ's Judgment

1643
In its reference for a preliminary ruling, the Landesgericht Linz (District Court of Linz) stated that according to § 364a ABGB (Austrian Civil Code), as interpreted by the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court), installations such as power plants operating on the basis of foreign authorizations could be the subject of actions for injunctions to prevent nuisances to neighboring property. In contrast, installations authorized by Austrian authorities could only be the subject of claims for compensation for damage caused to neighboring property. The Landesgericht mainly asked the ECJ-by way of not less than 19 lengthy questions-whether such a discriminatory treatment is an infringement of Articles 10, 12, 28 and/or 43 EC Treaty.
23
The findings of the Court can be summarized in a nutshell: The ECJ first noted that operating a nuclear power plant is an industrial activity that falls within the scope of application of the Euratom Treaty.
24 Then the Court argued "that although the principle of prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of nationality within the scope of application of Community law is expressly laid down only in Article 12 EC, it is a general principle which is also applicable under the EAEC Treaty."
25
After that the ECJ declared that the discrimination contained in the Austrian law in question "leads to the same outcome as a difference in treatment on grounds of nationality. that the principle of prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality within the scope of application of the EAEC Treaty precludes the application of the legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which an undertaking in possession of the necessary official authorisations for operating a nuclear power plant situated in the territory of another Member State, may be the subject of an action for an injunction to prevent an actual or potential nuisance to neighbouring property emanating from that installation, whereas undertakings having an industrial installation situated in the Member State where the action is brought and in possession of an official authorisation may not be the subject of such an action and may only be the subject of a claim for damages for harm caused to a neighbouring property.
30
C. A Short Critique of the Judgment
The Court rightly found that the Temelfn dispute falls within the scope of application of the Euratom Treaty.
31
Neither the Land Oberosterreich and the Landesgericht Linz nor Advocate General Maduro 32 realized that EAEC law is decisive in this case; this demonstrates once again that Euratom is hardly visible and its law is unknown to many legal experts. However, the ECJ's key findings are only partly convincing. On one hand, it is questionable whether the potential discriminatory treatment of the Austrian law in question is an infringement of Euratom law (Part C.l.). On the other hand, even if § 364a ABGB implies undue difference in treatment, it is debatable whether it cannot be justified on grounds of protecting public health (Part C.ll.). 
I. Illicit Discrimination Under Euratom Law?
In the particular field of nuclear energy policy, the Euratom Treaty created a self-contained regime.
33 Some authors-and maybe also the ECJ-seem to underestimate or neglect this fact. They argue that the EAEC Treaty is a rather limited lex specialis with regard to the EC/TFEU Treaty. From this point of view, EU/EC law is applicable also in the nuclear sector if specific Euratom provisions do not exist or are incomplete. 34 Moreover, this approach could even imply a hierarchy of norms.
35
However, it has to be emphasized that all "[t]reaties enjoy the same position and binding force in the Community legal system of sources."
36 If we follow the basic approach that each founding treaty is autonomous, "the notion that the EC Treaty applies (and was meant to apply) 'across the board' to all economic activity (including the nuclear industry) is to be rejected."
37
In its Temelfn judgment, the ECJ mentions the former Art. 305 (2) EC Treaty, which provides that the EC Treaty shall not affect the provisions of the Euratom Treaty. 38 lt rightly notes that the Euratom Treaty does not contain an explicit general prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of nationality. 39 Nevertheless, the Court decides that Art.
12 EC Treaty (now 18 TFEU) is a "general principle" that also applies to the Euratom Treaty: "it would appear to be contrary to both the purpose and the consistency of the treaties to allow discrimination on grounds of nationality ... to be tolerated within the scope of application of the EAEC 
No Possible Justification?
Even if one accepts the notion that the Austrian Civil Code provision in question means an illicit difference in treatment, there are good reasons to argue that it can be justified on grounds of protecting public health. According to the ECJ, a member state has no choice but to recognize authorizations by authorities of other member states if the latter comply with European basic standards ·of nuclear radiation protection.
45
This is "fairly strict compared to normal recognition cases." 46 In contrast, Advocate General Madura argued that Austrian courts have a certain scope of discretion not to recognize authorizations by authorities of other member states "if such a refusal is non-discriminatory in nature and is properly justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health and provided that proper account is taken of compliance with relevant Community rules and the interests of all affected parties." 47 At this point it should be added that it is questionable whether § 364a ABGB really implies a discriminatory treatment; the Austrian federal government and the Land Oberosterreich called the respective interpretation of the national law by the Landesgericht Linz into question (while the Court rightly refused to interpret Austrian law).
48
If there is a difference in treatment, it can perhaps be justified by the fact that the protection of public health against the risks of nuclear radiation is a key element and goal of the Euratom Treaty (which justifies, at least to a certain extent, its continued 
D. The Decisive Political Question
From a political point of view, it is of minor importance whether or not § 364a ABGB implies an illicit difference in treatment under Euratom law. However, the ECJ, when judging this issue, deemed it necessary to answer the crucial question of who ultimately decides the level of nuclear radiation protection in the EU multi-level system. Apparently, the Court was afraid that Euratom's health and safety policy and/or the EU's legal system in general could be weakened by national measures which aim at more rigorous protection than the EAEC's basic standards. 54 Thus, it ruled that Euratom provides for a sufficient 49 Grunwald, supra note 2; Grunwald, supra note 9; Serrano, supra note 11, at 17. 
I. Unilateralism
According to the Land Oberosterreich, the dispute should be decided on the basis of Austrian standards since Austrian territory is affected by actual or potential damage resulting from the operation of the Temelfn nuclear power plant. Let us assume for a second that the Temelfn case is decided according to this mode of governance.
61
While unilateralism would ensure a high level of nuclear radiation protection for Austrian property owners and citizens (as they expect, see Part B.), Czech interests would be completely neglected. From the perspective of both input and output legitimacy, this approach would only be advantageous for the Austrian party. The unilateral approach apparently contradicts the legal principle of mutual recognition.
62
Moreover, it disregards the "moral commitment to the 'inclusion of the other '" 63 in the EU multi-level polity. 
Ill. Deliberative Nationalism
Advocate General Madura argued that the dispute should be decided on the basis of Austrian, Czech and European rules. From his point of view, Austrian courts are competent to assess whether the Czech authorization provides a sufficient protection for Austrian citizens and property owners. However, by doing this they have to take into account both European and Czech law and interests. First, they have to consider that the Czech authorization of the Temelfn nuclear power plant complies with Euratom nuclear safety measures. These measures may already take into account Austrian interests to a satisfactory degree. 77 In a second step, "the Austrian courts must take account of the benefits to the Czech Republic of the existence of this facility and cannot base its Obviously, deliberative nationalism as a mode of governance is much more demanding than both unilateralism and hierarchical supranationalism.
80
According to the latter approaches, either national law (unilateralism) or supranational law (hierarchical supranationalism) has to prevail. In contrast, deliberative nationalism seeks to balance rules and interests of different jurisdictions in order to find a solution that leads "each party to internalize in its own decision the interests of the other. '' 81 This means, from the perspective of input legitimacy, that the respective will of Austrian and Czech citizens is not simply overruled. With regard to output legitimacy, the people in both Austria and the Czech Republic probably have to accept a limited implementation of their respective interests. Nevertheless, it seems that this mode of governance is more likely to achieve a moderate win-win situation in the Temelfn dispute than unilateralism and hierarchical supranationalism. However, if Austrian courts, after balancing Austrian, Czech and European law and interests, actually refuse to recognize the Czech authorization, Czech authorities and courts are likely not to accept and enforce such a "biased" decision. 82 The key disadvantage of deliberative nationalism is that one member state may question the other member state's way of balancing all the interests at stake. A European solution could prevent such a dilemma, but hierarchical supranationalism has its own disadvantages (see Part E.ll.). Against this background, a fourth approach not represented in the Temelfn case will be discussed in the next section.
/V. Deliberative Supranationalism
As was pointed out in the previous subsections, a unilateral decision to end the Temelfn dispute is likely to increase the tensions between the two neighboring EU member states Austria and Czech Republic (Part E.l.). A simple hierarchical supranational solution based on the supremacy of EU or EAEC law risks to neglect the fact "that antinuclear politics is a part of the Austrian identity" 83 (Part E.ll.). Even if one party takes a deliberative approach and tries to balance all interests and rules at stake, the other party will probably not accept an outcome that contradicts its key interests (Part E. Ill.).
Against this backdrop, the concept of "deliberative supranationalism" 84 seems to combine the advantages of both hierarchical supranationalism and deliberative nationalism: a Europe does not have a "higher legislative authority" like the US Congress; this usually means that the ECJ steps in since it does "not hesitate to take a decision. This is a disempowerment of politics by law."
90
In the context of Euratom, the Council could act as a deliberative body with the task to solve structural problems underlying conflicts such as the Temelfn case. However, the Council is not likely to take action if a significant number of member states do not feel affected and several countries as well as the Commission favor hierarchical supranationalism since European law seems to support their position. The existing legal framework in the EU does not frequently induce member state governments to engage in deliberation. One could imagine a multi-level polity in which all member states would only be entitled to the benefits of supranational law if they found unanimous solutions to fundamental conflicts. With regard to the Temelfn dispute, this could mean that without a political compromise, states like the Czech Republic would not have the right to invoke European law in order to sell and transfer their electricity generated by nuclear power to other member states (i.e. the economic freedoms would be partially suspended). On the other side, Austria and other anti-nuclear countries would not be allowed to invoke EU law (e.g. secondary law on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in other member states) in order to extend their high technical standards to countries like the Czech Republic if they did not accept the basic notion that they may not impose their total ban of nuclear power plants on other member states.
91
If European law favors just one party in a conflict, game-theoretic considerations 92 suggest that this party has no incentive to take the interests of the other parties involved into account. This is a structural shortcoming of the EU's existing legal framework since a mode of governance derives "its legitimacy from the quality of the procedures guiding its decision-making process."
93
The ECJ increasingly decides on fundamental conflicts between national core policies and rather rarely applies a deliberative conflicts-law approach.
94 As in the Temelfn case, it regularly promotes hierarchical supranationalism.
Advocates of this rather parsimonious mode of governance featuring the doctrine of supremacy of EU law should not underestimate the fact that "the Court is now intervening 90 Joerges, supra note 54, at 45. Several months after the maximum credible accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, the Japanese authorities and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO, the owner of the power station) still do not have full control of three damaged reactors and are unable to prevent the daily environmental exposure to high doses of radiation. 96 Tens of thousands of people had to leave their hometowns, and many of them will probably never be able to return to their houses. 97 Due to this disaster, German and Swiss governments, as well as most Japanese citizens, changed their attitudes towards nuclear energy. Additionally, the Italians overwhelmingly rejected a government initiative to produce nuclear energy in Italy by means of referendum. 98 However, it seems that most states with nuclear power plants-including Japan-do not intend to (significantly) change their nuclear energy policies.
99
At a high-level conference on nuclear safety in June 2011, although the ministers of the IAEA member states stressed the need to learn lessons from the accident and to draw up an action plan, they did not adopt legally binding instruments. 100 The European Commission enacted an emergency measure to protect consumers in the EU from contaminated Japanese food and feed. 101 [Vol. 12 No. 08
consisting of one Commission representative and six ENSREG members), and the publication of both the national reports and .the results of the peer reviews.
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Japan is an IAEA member state, but it is not a member of a supranational organization like the EAEC. If a nuclear disaster like Fukushima happened in an EU member state, would Euratom provide specific means to better cope with the situation? In the first days after the accident, the Japanese authorities were criticized because they only reluctantly published scarce information regarding levels of nuclear radiation and contamination. Moreover, they may have decided too late to evacuate ten thousands of people and trusted too long in TEPCO's problem-solving abilities. With regard to these points, Euratom appears to possess promising instruments. First, the Commission is always informed about the levels of radioactivity in the member states according to Commission is not controlled by or dependent on another political institution (e.g. the Council) and may quickly ask the ECJ for support. Unsurprisingly, this comprehensive legal competence to enact extensive emergency measures (Notverordnungsrecht) is confined to serious cases of urgency. As was pointed out in the previous sections, hierarchical supranationalism is not and should not be mandatory when it comes to decide on general Euratom policies. The nuclear stress tests mentioned above could give rise to more deliberative modes of policy-making in this particular field of European multi-level policy. lt is not the first time that a nuclear disaster outside of the EU has triggered new EAEC activities (see Part A.). The lack of consensus among the EU member states regarding nuclear energy may justify a revision or even the abolishment of the Euratom Treaty, 103 but the Treaty's remarkable supranational instruments designed to deal with long-term crossborder problems such as nuclear radiation and proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be called into question.
104
103 Joerges, supra note 91, at 5-6, discusses the applicability of the new European Citizens' Initiative with regard to a revision of the Euratom Treaty.
